This is my essay for a government class about what was possible in Yugoslavia don'y any of you slimy bastards steal it cause I can prove its mine.
What is possible? What was possible? Was it possible for the people of Yugoslavia to emerge from the fall of the Soviet Union in a better position than they are in now? These questions are the core in the examination of the situation of the Balkans as it emerged from the shadow of the Soviet Union. While these questions offer up an infinite amount of possibilities dependent upon even the slightest of variables, it is important to examine these situations with optimism. We must, therefore, allow ourselves assume, despite our better judgment, that the situation in Yugoslavia could have resulted in better positioning for the various groups located in the region of Yugoslavia. Several factors must be examined in order to understand what this improved position would look like, how it could have been conceived, what the reality on the ground was and how those involved could have improved the situation of the peoples of Yugoslavia and what they needed to know in order to make these improvements.
First we must examine what the ideal state would look like in order to ascertain how the peoples of Yugoslavia could have obtained such a state. The definition of a “perfect state” is rather controversial and depending on who one talks to one may receive many different viewpoints. Francis Fukuyama in State Building identifies the various forms of the state in relation of their institutional strength and scope of state functions. He highlights that in the early 1990s economists were very much in favor of a weak state with a limited scope. They justified this in their belief that the market would “self organize” and that state functions would somehow take care of themselves (Fukuyama 15). However, by the late 90s and into 2000 the focus would shift from this broad weakening of strength and scope to a priority of state strength over scope. Fukuyama cites the contrast between East Asia and Latin America in deference to the strength and quality of their institutions and how it correlates to their economic success (Fukuyama 19).
It is the personal belief of the author that having a state with limited scope and greater strength is a step toward an overall more ideal state; at least in the case of a state that is in a transitional phase such, as the one we will be dealing with shortly (Yugoslavia). As identified by Milton Friedman, the role of law is incredibly important in the economic success of a state (Fukuyama 19). As it stands, a state making the transition to democracy will not have the capacity it once enjoyed under a more authoritarian rule. As authoritarian transition relies heavily on the quality of the leader, transition under authoritarian conditions may undermine the legitimacy of the state, and its ability to establish the rule of law, whereas democracy is self legitimizing and better able to withstand economic hardship. This lends to the state a greater capacity which will allow it to establish and enforce its own laws. In the World Bank‘s “World Development Report” in 1997, the World Bank indentified the rule of law and macroeconomic management as a few of the key building blocks of a state (Fukuyama 8).Without these things a state does not have the capacity to meet the needs of its people. In short a state that is able to focus its energies on establishing the rule of law and economic growth will allow the state, and the members thereof, to establish the institutions sought after by the general public.
Another advantage to a state with limited scope is the degree of transparency that it lends itself to. Fukuyama indentifies the functions of the public sector as particularly difficult to monitor (Fukuyama 55).However, the functions that are at the disposal of the state, when the state has a small scope, are more easily monitored as their output is almost immediately identifiable. For example, once again referring to the functions of state provided by the World Bank, it is easy to identify if the government has fulfilled its responsibility in improving equity or if it has provided basic public goods. The population can easily identify if these things are provided to them. However if the state is given a greater scope transparency becomes limited as it is not as easy to identify the effects of such functions as education and various mechanisms of the economy. Fukuyama states clearly that there can be no “formal mechanism for delivering transparency and accountability (Fukuyama 55). In leaving the less transparent functions closer to the people, i.e. delegated locally, I contend that they will be more easily manipulated by the people for the common good; and in leaving transparent functions in the hands of the government the government will remain accountable to the will of the public.
To establish how Yugoslavia may have made a successful transition to democracy we must identify the institutions called for by the public and what institutions were intact after the fall of communism. According to polling cited by V.P Gagnon in The Myth of Ethnic War the vast majority of Yugoslavia was concerned with political and economic reform that would increase the standard of living and “basic economic security” (Gagnon 33).The polling data provided in the second chapter of The Myth of Ethnic War indicates that Yugoslavia was lacking certain basic functions of state, improving equity and a desirable degree of Macroeconomic management. It is clear that the people found certain aspects of their government lacking and demonstrated as much by showing strong support for the federal prime minister, and strong proponent of reform, Ante Markovic; even going as far as to support giving his government (SIV) more power and setting up its own political party (Gagnon 42).All indications from the public showed that the state was moving, or desired to move, toward a greater scope and strength of state functions, much like the rest of Europe (Fukuyama fig.5). For various reasons, illuminated later, Yugoslavia did not achieve its reforms right away. Had the will of the people been properly translated, the ruling elite may have been able to slowly reform and still maintain their power much in the ways the Hungarian elite had (Gagnon 192). In this way the conservative element would have remained in its place, in line with its desires, and the population general would have versions of the liberal policies and institutions they desired.
History makes it clear, however, that the conservative elites in Yugoslavia did not want these reforms to take place unless they were on their terms. As mentioned earlier the general public was largely in favor of liberal political and economic reforms. These reforms were championed in the form of Prime Minister Ante Markovic. In early 1990 Markovic had proven the effectiveness of his reforms by reducing inflation and improving the economy. In July 1990 Markovic created his own political party to further his reform policies. This, and mass political demonstrations in June of that year for the creation of a multiparty system, which in turn generated universal adult suffrage, posed a substantial threat to the conservative order (Gagnon 91). This forced a shift in conservative policy away from recentralization of Yugoslavia to a policy of destruction of Tito’s Yugoslavia and the creation of a new, smaller, centralized state where Yugoslavia used to be (Gagnon 92). Another threat facing the conservative elite hailed from the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) lead by Vuk Draskovic. Draskovic was also able to mobilize the greater population against Slobodan Milosevic and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). The conservative response was to create and escalate the violence with the Albanians and divert the country’s attention to the issue of Kosovo (Gagnon 97).
This strategy of using violence to divert the country’s attention away from domestic issues and gain support for an unpopular party is identified by Gagnon as “demobilization” or the imposition of homogeneity on a politically heterogeneous social space (Gagnon 7). In recognizing the damage liberal reforms could have to their conservative positions Milosevic and the SPS pursued this strategy whenever there was popular mobilization against the ruling party. Using the SDS abroad Milosevic was able to spark armed conflict between Serbian guerillas and military and civilians alike in Croatia. Milosevic would then define this conflict in ethnic terms to the outside world and portray it as atrocities against the innocent Serbian population abroad to the Serbs at home (Gagnon 100). Using this method several times Milosevic was able to “silence and marginalize” the opposition. Whenever the population did manage to force multi-party elections in 1991, Milosevic tailored his rhetoric to soothe the masses; using a moderate stance calling for peace and economic stability. However, behind the scenes Milosevic made a deal with Croatian President Tudjman to agree on a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina to assure that he would not be attacked in his weakened position (Gagnon103).
Interestingly, the situation in Croatia was very similar. The ruling party under Franjo Tudjman used many strategies implemented by the SPS. For example, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) right, for there was a deep division within the party, would always present a moderate candidate during elections. In the 1990 election, in lieu of addressing specific issues the HDZ right used the looming threat of Slobodan Milosevic to espouse a party line portraying itself as the only party able to defend Croatia. It was said best by Ivica Racan after the 1990 election “Milosevic’s aggressive policy was the strongest propaganda for Tudjman.”(Gagnon 137). When the war came to a close in 1992 The HDZ right could no longer point to Serb aggressions in Croatia and justify its unpopular policies (Gagnon 153). Even after the war the HDZ right was severely lagging in the polls due to a surprisingly unchanged public sentiment (Gagnon 156). In order to retain leadership the HDZ implemented its strategy of demobilization. It moderated its party line and changed the electoral rules so as to favor the ruling party. The HDZ also took control of, security forces, the media and once again provoked a war in parts of Bosnia (Gagnon 157,157). This strategy of demobilization allowed Tudjman to maintain power until his death in 1999 (Gagnon 173).
The SPS and the HDZ also shared a similar end in that demobilization had reached its limits and was no longer effective in either country. In the case of Serbia it seemed to be a matter of overconfidence. Milosevic had changed the electoral rules and created a popular vote. He also moved up the elections, fully believing that he would win based on his campaign of accusing the opposition of being foreign agents. When it became clear that he was going lose, even in the second round of voting, the SPS annulled the election results and set the election to be held at “sometime in the future.” Milosevic went on to lose the 2000 election (Gagnon127, 128). In the case of Croatia Franjo Tudjman had died and the HDZ right was not forced to front a moderate candidate. This overconfident miscalculation, coupled with the inability to provoke another war, spelled defeat for the HDZ in 2000 (Gagnon 174). By 2000, however, this shift in politics no longer reached the bases of conservative power in either country. During the process of demobilization the elites of the HDZ right and SPS transferred as much of the state’s assets into private ownership as possible, or managed to garner wealth illegally with the help of the federal government (Gagnon 129, 130, 175).
In the spirit of Otto Von Bismarck let us now consider what was possible. What would have been required to achieve a better outcome? We must first examine the public general and what they would have needed to appropriately react to demobilization. They would have first needed to understand the motivations driving the conflicts that were central to the conservative’s strategy of demobilization. If the Serbs had known that the violence in Croatia was generated by the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and used as a policy tool to promote unpopular conservative actions at home, the population may have been mobilized against that specifically instead of in favor of general liberal reforms. If the Croatian population had been aware of the HDZ’s method of demobilization, that reflected Serbia’s method, they may have been able to take steps against it specifically. The inability of the masses to effectively resist demobilization until the conservatives were entrenched in the new system may be simply due to human nature. The concerns of the everyday citizen are not for the internal politics of one’s government, but rather the necessities of one’s own existence.
Apathy aside, if the masses were moved to action, what courses of action would be best to resolve the situation as a citizen of an increasingly oppressive regime? A simple solution would have to been to recognize the threat immediately using the Russian conservative response as a precedent (Gagnon 193). Granted that early recognition is achieved, several courses of action are available. The simplest perhaps is the assassination of Milosevic. This not only would have removed him as a political force in Serbia, but would have removed him as the talking point in the HDZ right’s campaign for the 1990 election thus, perhaps averting the entire conflict. However, it is not unreasonable to believe that another person would have simply risen to replace Milosevic and executed virtually the same strategy. Another option would be sustained mass political participation. This does not limit the masses to demonstrations and riots; it also encourages higher voter turnout and greater resistance to the government acquisition of all major forms of media.
Another player in this scenario is the international community in the body of NATO and the United States. There were several things that this community did not understand before weighing in on the situation. They did not understand the motives behind the violence and only understood it as far as Serbian and Croatian media presented it to them, in terms of ethnic conflict (Gagnon 100). It is difficult to imagine that anyone outside the ruling elite at the time would be able to ascertain the true motives of the conservative element; however, such a precedent as Russia did exist so excuses are limited. The International community also failed, due to not understanding the motives and methods of violence, to recognize the effects of their own “peacekeeping efforts.” Indeed, the HDZ right was able to continue its violence in spite of UN peacekeeping troops standing in its country (Gagnon 153). Milosevic was even able to use the UN economic sanctions as a positive factor in his campaign against Panic. He asserted that the sanctions would contribute to the growth of small industries in Serbia (Gagnon 113). Using the efforts of NATO and the United States Milosevic was also able to perpetuate another round of demobilization after the US bombed Belgrade and other military targets. This actually caused some former opposition members to rally around Milosevic (Gagnon 125,126).
It is clear from the results of foreign intervention that many mistakes were made. The international community failed to fully understand the situation before it became involved. In retrospect it may have been difficult to fully understand the extent of the conservative’s plans, but, once again, the polling data was available and Russia was a non case example of a similar conservative reaction that, by the time the International community intervened, could have been understood. Again, based on knowledge the foreign powers should have had, economic sanctions should have been constructed to make it clear that the HDZ right and SPS were the confrontational factors in this conflict and that their discontinuation and absolution should have been assured before the sanctions were lifted. It is also the opinion of the author and Herb Cohen, author of You Can Negotiate Anything, that ultimatums are rarely if ever effective tools in generating a positive response from the opposing side. Hence, the United States’ use of an ultimatum, “sign a peace agreement or face military action”, was foolish and resulted in major setbacks for the opposition (Gagnon 125).
“Politics is the art of the possible”, indeed there were many things possible in deference to the supposed “ethnic war” in Yugoslavia. A strong state with a narrow scope would have provided the transparency needed to establish a strong base for state development; and by all indications that’s where Yugoslavia was headed. However, the violent response, and efforts to demobilize the population, of the conservative elites in the SPS and HDZ right prevented such growth from occurring until said conservatives were comfortably entrenched in the new form of society. Had the people had the appropriate knowledge of the motives of their governments they may have been mobilized in a more specific way to counter the conservative response. Finally, the international community was not adequately knowledgeable to take truly effective action in Serbia and Croatia without first giving each respective country room to commit further acts of violence and demobilization. If the reader will allow me to expand upon this, we too have experienced such demobilization. Indeed, Fukuyama identifies the United States’ use of the tragedy of 9/11 to bolster its support in what has become very destructive legislation and gross infringements on our rights as Americans, al a Patriot act. The most recent example of demobilization has occurred in Pakistan and it follows a similar pattern outlined by Gagnon. Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf has donned civilian clothes, to moderate his message, and declared a state of emergency, to demobilize his competition and control the timing of the election. All of which seems very similar to Milosevic’s campaign strategy. It is my opinion that the “populism” is constantly being turned on and off by the mischiefs of “elitism”; to borrow some phrasing from the Federalists and Martin Diamond if I may, but there is hope because in the end the people will get what they want, one way or another.
Works cited
Fukuyama,Francis. 2004. State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca,New York: Cornell Press.
Gagnon,V.P ,jr. 2004. The Myth of Ethnic War:Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s. Ithaca,New York: Cornell Press.
